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The United States International Trade Commission is a six-
member independent agency' which has broad investigative
powers under several statutes to investigate factors relating to
the foreign trade of the United States, with an emphasis on the
competitive impact of imported products in the domestic markets
of U.S. producers. This article will discuss four such statutory pro-
visions: sections 201 and 406 of the Trade Act of 1974, under
which the Commission may recommend that the President impose
restrictions on imports of a given product from any source or from
designated communist countries, respectively; and sections 705
and 735 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979,1 under which Commission findings act as
a final order which authorizes the Department of Commerce' to
impose special duties on subsidized imports or imports sold at less
than fair value. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the
Commission's investigative methods for conducting these cases
and the standards for reaching statutory determinations are con-
verging. This appears true in spite of the different philosophies
underlying the enactment of each of these statutory provisions
and the different statutory remedies in the laws.
* A torney-Adviser, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. International Trade Commis-
sion. The views expressed herein are entirely personal and do not put forth any official
policy of the U.S. International Trade Commission or any member or officer of the Commis-
sion.
I The Executive branch has no control over Commission budget submissions, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2232 (1976), or litigation, 19 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976). Presidential control of the Chairmanship of
the Commission is circumscribed (Pub. L. No. 95-106, § 2(a), 91 Stat. 867 (1977)).
19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976) and 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1976), respectively.
a 19 U.S.C. § 1671(d) (1976) and 19 U.S.C. § 1673(d) (1976), respectively.
' Prior to the effective date of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the Treasury Depart-
ment performed these functions. The responsibilities were transferred to the Department
of Commerce by Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979 issued under the authority of the
Reorganization Act of 1977 and section 1109 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
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II. STATUTORY DETERMINATIONS
A. The Trade Act of 1974
Section 201 is the domestic legislation implementing the so-
called "escape clause" in Article XIX of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).5 The GATT has provided a forum
for multilateral reductions in national tariffs by member-
signatories. Article XIX is an "escape clause" from concessions
negotiated under the aegis of the GATT8 which might result in an
increase in imports with the consequence of injuring seriously or
threatening to injure seriously the competing domestic industry.
The article provides in part that
[i]f, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of
the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this agree-
ment, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported
into the territory of that contracting party in such increased
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten
serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or
directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be
free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such
time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury to
suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or
modify the concession.7
Under section 201, the Commission is directed to conduct in-
vestigations to determine whether a product is being imported into
the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substan-
tial cause of serious injury, or threat thereof, to the domestic in-
dustry producing an article like or directly competitive with the
imported article If the Commission makes an affirmative injury
determination under section 201, it is required to recommend an
appropriate remedy to the President Should the President im-
' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, January 1, 1948, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
Several multilateral negotiations concerning the exchange of tariff concessions have
been held under the auspices of the GATT: Geneva (1947); Annecy (1949); Torquay
(1950-1951); Geneva (1955-1956); Geneva (1961-1962); Geneva (1963-1967); Geneva (1975-1979).
In addition to tariff concessions, contracting parties to the GATT undertake not to impose
quotas on imports except for temporary use for balance of payments purposes (Article XI).
7 GATT, supra note 5, Article XIX, para. 1(a) (emphasis added).
Id. at subsection 201(b)(1).
' Id. Subsection 201(d)(1) provides that in the event the Commission finds injury as a result
of its investigation it shall recommend an increase in or imposition of any duty or import
restriction necessary to prevent such injury or, if it determines that adjustment assistance
can effectively remedy the injury, it may recommend adjustment assistance. Section 203
authorizes the President to negotiate orderly marketing agreements also. The Commission
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pose a recommended trade restriction or another trade restriction
it must be applied on a most-favored-nation basis to all exporters
of the product.0 If a particular exporting nation is a GATT
member, Article XIX entitles it to compensation in the form of
withdrawing an equivalent concession or compensatory conces-
sions from the nation invoking the escape clause." Both the most-
favored-nation application of trade restrictions and the GATT
compensation requirement can be avoided by negotiating bilateral
agreements with the exporting nations.
Section 406 of the Trade Act concerns market disruption caused
by imports from communist countries. The provision has a strange
origin. The concept of market disruption was formulated in
response to the abrupt increase in U.S. imports of cotton textiles
in the late 1950's.2 The concept provided an explanation for the
adverse effect of a sharp increase in imports into established
markets of industrial countries as a result of a shift in com-
parative advantage to new sources. The concept was distinguished
from the "escape clause" concept of serious injury in GATT Arti-
cle XIX on two bases. First, the adverse impact of the imports
was not considered "injurious enough" to invoke the national
legislation implementing the escape clause. 3 Second, an obligation
to provide for compensation to affected exporters within the
terms of Article XIX was lacking.1
A GATT Working Party convened in 1960 to study the issue of
market disruption and develop guidelines for describing the con-
cept. In response to the recommendations of the Working Party,
the GATT pronounced that
in a number of countries situations occur or threaten to occur
which have been described as market disruption .... These
situations generally contain the following elements in combina-
tion:
does not recommend such agreements generally as it would frustrate the provision on
subsection 203(c)(1) for a congressional override of the President's failure to implement a
Commission recommendation.
GATT Doc. L/76 (1953).
1 GATT, supra note 5, Article XIX, para. 3.
" G. PATTERSON, DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THE POLICY ISSUES, 1945-1965,
at 299 (1966).
1, S. D. Metzger, Injury and Market Disruption from Imports, in United States Interna-
tional Economic Policy in an Inderdependent World -Papers Submitted to the Commission
on International Trade and Investment Policy, 167-189 (1971).
" See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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(i) a sharp and substantial increase or potential in-
crease of imports of particular products from par-
ticular sources;
(ii) these products are offered at prices which are sub-
stantially below those prevailing for similar goods
of comparable quality in the market of the import-
ing country;
(iii) there is serious damage to domestic producers or
threat thereof;
(iv) the price differentials referred to in paragraph (ii)
above do not arise from governmental intervention
in the fixing or formation of prices or from dump-
ing practices.
In some situations other elements are also present and the
enumeration above is not, therefore, intended as an exhaustive
definition of market disruption.15
This approach to market disruption influenced both the "Short-
Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Tex-
tiles" (1961-1962)6 and the "Long-Term Arrangement Regarding
International Trade in Cotton Textiles" (1962-1973)." The suc-
cessor to the "Long-Term Agreement," the "Arrangement Regard-
ing International Trade in Textiles," 8 in force since 1974, contains
a far more elaborate description of the concept.
The description developed by the 1960 GATT Working Party
was ". . . intended to exclude problems arising from imports from
state-controlled economies." More specifically, the language in
point (iv) ".... was intended to restrict the concept to goods sold at
low prices because of cost factors alone, that is description for
which countervailing or anti-dumping duties were not generally
applicable."' 9 Nevertheless, the so-called "Trade Reform Act of
1973" proposed by the Nixon administration in 197320 adopted the
concept to imports from communist countries granted most-
favored-nation (MFN) treatment on the grounds that MFN treat-
ment would stimulate imports and that communist economies are
capable of supplying imports virtually on a permanent basis at
,' GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 9th Supp. (1961), at 26.
12 U.S.T. 1675, T.I.A.S. No. 4884.
17 13 U.S.T. 2672, T.I.A.S. No. 5240.
25 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840.
G. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 305 n.62.
'0 H.R. 6767, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(f)(2) and § 505.
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prices lower than those prevailing for competitive goods in the im-
porting country. This analysis takes into account the inapplicability
of pricing concepts in a non-market economy and the ability of a
non-market economy to manipulate prices or costs to result in no
remedial duties being applied to imports.'
The 1973 bill was eventually enacted as section 406 of the Trade
Act. The provision was not substantially changed by the House
Ways and Means Committee and was passed by the House in that
same year.' The Senate Finance Committee, however, made ex-
tensive changes in the market disruption provision of the bill and
the Finance Committee version was passed by the Senate.23
Among the changes was the application of the provision to all
communist countries, whether or not they were granted most-
favored-nation status. The Conference Committee made minor
amendments to the Senate version.
Section 406 directs that the Commission conduct investigations
to determine, with respect to imports of a product which is from a
communist country, whether market disruption exists with
respect to the product produced by a domestic industry. The sec-
tion further states that market disruption
exists within a domestic industry whenever imports of an arti-
cle, like or directly competitive with an article produced by such
domestic industry, are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or
relatively, so as to be a significant cause of material injury, or
threat thereof, to such domestic industry ......
B. The Trade Agreements Act
The Trade Agreements Act added Title VII to the Tariff Act of
1930, which replaced the Antidumping Act, 1921, and amended
the countervailing duty statute. The new provisions of the Tariff
Act for antidumping and countervailing duty investigations are in-
tentionally parallel and, to a large degree, identical.
Neither the antidumping nor the countervailing duty provision
is intended to protect domestic industries from the importation of
21 In cases where the manufacturer's home country is a state controlled economy, foreign
market value is determined by the price to third countries or by the constructed value of
the merchandise produced in a non-state controlled economy. This latter situation does not
involve any price discrimination. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1976).
H.R. 10710, Trade Reform Act of 1973, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., § 405.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE. TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 210-213 (1974).
"4 CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, CONFERENCE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 10710, TRADE ACT
OF 1974, H.R. REP. No. 93-1644, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., Amendment No. 389, 44-49 (1974).
25 Subsection 406(e)(2) (emphasis added).
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products. The antidumping statute was designed to provide a
customs remedy to prevent foreign industries from selling pro-
ducts into the U.S. market for lower prices than those charged in
their national markets or in other export markets.2 ' The dif-
ference is referred to as less than fair value. When such price dif-
ferences are established by the Department of Commerce and the
Commission finds that a domestic industry is materially injured or
threatened with material injury, a special duty is imposed to equal
the price difference. In the case of the countervailing duty statute,
there is no foreign price to take into account. This statute is not a
price discrimination statute, but rather is designed to countervail
a foreign government subsidy which might result in exports injur-
ing competing U.S. industries. The rationale of the countervailing
duty statute is that it is unfair to force domestic industries to com-
pete against foreign government treasuriesY
In the case of an antidumping duty investigation, the Depart-
ment of Commerce officials attempt to adjust arms-length selling
prices to calculate a theoretical ex-factory price of goods sold in
the foreign market (or a third market) to compare with the ad-
justed price of goods sold for export to the United States." De-
mand factors in the different markets are only relevant insofar as
they relate to product and cost of production differences. Also,
higher profits from one product line are not recognized as a
legitimate source of subsidy for a price difference in another pro-
duct line.
Countervailing duty investigations are altogether different
than antidumping investigations. They focus on foreign legislation
authorizing subsidies to manufacturers. The output of those
manufacturers utilizing the subsidies which is actually exported
to the United States is calculated and allocated against the volume
of exports to arrive at an ad valorem equivalent of the subsidy on
a per-unit basis. Should imports of these products injure com-
peting U.S. industries, the ad valorem duty is collected to counter-
vail the subsidy. There is no relevant price difference between the
imported and the domestically produced products.
2 See Dickey, The Pricing of Imports into the United States, 13 J. OF WORLD TRADE L.
238 (1979); A Guide for Pricing Commodities to Enter the Commerce of the United States,
11 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 491 (1979).
2 See Marks and Malmgren, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade, 7 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 327, 347 (1975).
28 See note 25 supra.
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The determination required of the Department of Commerce in
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations is whether
the merchandise imported into the United States is either sold at
less than fair value or subsidized. The determination required of
the Commission in each statute is whether "an industry in the
United States is materially injured, or is threatened with material
injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States is
materially retarded by reason of that merchandise."
If the Commission makes an affirmative determination and the
Commerce Department issues a finding of dumping, it is impor-
tant to realize that the foreign exporters affected by the finding
could cease trading or adjust their prices for export to the United
States or in their home markets. The latter could be done to
eliminate or lessen the amount of any special duty which would
otherwise be assessed. Similarly, in the case of countervailing duty
orders, the foreign government could suspend payments under its
subsidy legislation or institute export taxes on the products sub-




An injury determination under each of these four statutory pro-
visions can result in the imposition of import restraints if the
Commission concludes that the complained-of imports are respon-
sible for the injury, whether actual or threatened, to the U.S. in-
dustry producing the product most comparable with the imports.
Each of these statutes is oriented toward a specific product; a
determination of injury with respect to one product does not af-
fect the importation of other products. This product orientation
requires that the Commission have comparable statistics on a
product-line basis to analyze the impact of allegedly injurious im-
ports on the complaining industry. However, official statistics on
imports and domestic output are not comparable, and statistics on
product-line basis are rarely available for either imports or
domestic articles.' Thus, the necessity that the Commission
generate such data governs the character of Commission in-
vestigations.
" Quinn and Sood, Cutting Through the Maze of Trade Data Classification, COLUMBIA J.
OF WORLD Bus. (Fall 1978), at 54.
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Although there is an obvious adversary relationship between
complaining domestic firms and importers, very few firms with
the data necessary for conducting the required market research in
any given investigation will have an adverse stake in the outcome
of a Commission injury determination. The most obvious example
is an importer whose merchandise is not subject to a particular in-
vestigation. Another example is the distributor who handles both
competing domestic and imported merchandise.
A Commission investigation is initiated following the filing of a
petition adequately pleading the elements which, if established,
would entitle the petitioner to the relief sought and containing in-
formation concerning the petitioner's business, including the im-
port competition." Upon the receipt of a sufficient petition, the
Commission issues a notice of investigation, which is published in
the Federal Register. The notice typically invites the submission
of written comments either in lieu of or in addition to an ap-
pearance at a scheduled public hearing.
With the initiation of a formal investigation, the Commission's
investigative staff prepares questionnaires for firms producing,
importing, and distributing the products under investigation. The
investigators determine the scope of the market to be surveyed
and draft requests for data (the quantity and value of shipments,
inventories, etc.). The investigators then field test the question-
naires in personal interviews with a sample of potential recipients
to confirm the customary use of terminology describing the pro-
ducts, the manner in which firms in the particular business keep
records, etc. After field testing, the questionnaires are mailed to
selected importers and producers to insure statistically valid
coverage for a survey of the product market. Questionnaires are
also mailed to domestic purchasers of both the complained-of im-
ported products and the domestically produced products to verify
the prices reported by the importers and producers and to trace
sales allegedly lost by petitioners to the complained-of imports.
Each questionnaire contains carefully drafted instructions concern-
ing the confidential treatment accorded responses in order to
preserve voluntary compliance with the Commission's requests
for information. The sensitivity of the questionnaire procedure is
quite apparent -if competitive commercial and financial data are




not granted confidential treatment, the Commission will not have
enough time to compel compliance from many firms.3'
B. Public hearings
Public hearings in these investigations are legislative rather
than adjudicative. Witnesses are encouraged to submit prepared
statements prior to the hearing and to summarize the prepared
statements at the hearing. Testimony is not made subject to for-
mal examination and exhibits are not formally authenticated. The
questioning of witnesses by participants at the hearing is permit-
ted only for the limited purpose of assisting the Commission in ob-
taining relevant and material facts concerning the subject matter
of the investigation.2 Persons who participated at the hearing are
given an opportunity to file posthearing briefs of limited length.
C. Administrative record
All of the factual material gathered by the Commission's staff
during the course of an investigation, including statistical data ag-
gregated from individual questionnaires, is assembled and analyzed
in a staff report to the Commission. This report together with all
written submissions, the questionnaire responses, and the
transcript of the public hearing, makes up the administrative
record of an investigation.3
Prior to the conduct of antidumping and countervailing duty in-
vestigations under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the staff
report was published along with the opinions of Commissioners
after the determination in the case in a version with confidential
data removed. As a result, the staff report was not available to in-
terested persons for rebuttal until the Commission's determina-
tion was lublished. This practice not only prevented rebuttal of
staff analysis during the course of the investigation, but also con-
tributed to a lack of focus in the public hearing. Since witnesses
for individual firms were often unaware of aggregate data col-
", The Commission is authorized to compel the production of documents and testimony.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1976).
32 19 C.F.R. § 201.12(c) (1979).
Section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by section 1001 of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, subjects Commission injury determinations in antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations to the substantial evidence test and, therefore, a deter-
mination must be on the record. Sections 201 and 406 result in advisory recommendations
to the President whose decision is political.
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lected by the Commission, they could not relate their experiences
to the market described to the Commission in the staff report.
The Commission's new regulations for the conduct of antidump-
ing and countervailing duty investigations provide for the
disclosure of the staff report, with confidential data removed,
before the hearing.' This should provide a focus for the public
hearings in these investigations. If these hearings are successful,
the practice may be extended to investigations conducted pur-
suant to sections 201 and 406 of the Trade Act of 1974.
IV. STANDARDS FOR INJURY DETERMINATIONS
The four statutes discussed in this paper are oriented to im-
ports of particular products to remedy injury caused by such im-
ports in the markets of domestic producers. This orientation, in
turn, requires that domestic industries be defined in terms of in-
dividual products-a necessary legal fiction which does not make
economic sense. Theories of industrial organization, capital and
employment markets and, indeed, the economic performance of
firms are sacrificed to measure the imports of a product against
domestic output of that product. Only those domestic productive
facilities devoted to the product under investigation are included
in the meaning of the term "industry" for the purpose of each of
these statutes."
The characteristics of an industry will be governed by the par-
ticular facts in a particular investigation. Because there is no
possible definition of "industry" which would be accurate in more
than one investigation, it is impossible to define "injury" or to for-
mulate the impact necessary to constitute injury with any preci-
sion. How much injury is necessary for the Commission to make
See 19 C.F.R. § 207.21, 44 Fed. Reg. 76458, December 26, 1979.
" Subsection 201(b)(3)(B) provides that for the purpose of determining serious injury or
threat thereof, in establishing the domestic industry producing an article like or directly
competitive with the imported article under investigation, the Commission
may, in the case of a domestic producer which produces more than one article,
treat as part of such domestic industry only that portion or subdivision of the pro-
ducer which produces the like or directly competitive article ...
The provisions of this subsection also apply with regard to investigations conducted under
section 406. See subsection 406(a)(2).
With regard to antidumping and countervailing duty investigations conducted under the
authority of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, subsection 771(7) refers to the impact of less-
than-fair-value or subsidized imports on domestic producers of like products. Subsection
771(10), in turn, defines the term like product as
a product which is like, or in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics
and uses with, the article subject to investigation . ..
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an affirmative determination is a matter of judgment and is made
on a case-by-case basis. The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply
to Commission injury determinations because a decision arrived
at in the context of the particular facts of a case may not be ap-
propriate for any other investigation.
This case-by-case approach to injury decisions may result in
perceptions of inconsistency. For example, one domestic industry
witness complained to a Congressional committee that-
the Commission seems to be able to use nearly any criterion or
any vague means it desires to determine whether there is injury
or not. And we would like to know definitely what constitutes
it. 36
This type of complaint is typical and has resulted in an increase in
Congressional oversight of Commission antidumping investiga-
tions, 7 as well as legislation for stricter standards for judicial
review of certain Commission determinations."
The case-by-case approach required by the focus of import trade
statutes on particular products has prevented the enactment of a
Legislative standard for the depth of injury necessary to trigger
an affirmative determination under each of these statutory provi-
sions. Congress did, however, address the problem with the adop-
tion of a check-list approach. For example, section 201 does not
define "serious injury, or threat thereof." Instead, the provision
lists certain economic factors which the Commission is required to
take into account in reaching a determination while explicitly
authorizing the Commission to consider any other economic fac-
tors it considers relevant in reaching a determination.
The present list of factors concerning serious injury and the
threat of serious injury is found in section 201(b)(2). That section
states
[i]n making its determination ... the Commission shall take
into account all economic factors which it considers relevant, in-
cluding (but not limited to)-
(A) with respect to serious injury the significant idling of pro-
ductive facilities in the industry, the inability of a significant
number of firms to operate at a reasonable level of profit, and
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives, on the Adequacy and Administration of the Antidumping Act of
1921, (Serial 95-46), 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 8, 1977.
7 Id.
" See, e.g., S. 1654, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (the so-called "Customs Courts Act of
1979").
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significant unemployment or underemployment within the in-
dustry;
(B) with respect to threat of serious injury a decline in sales, a
higher and growing inventory, and a downward trend in produc-
tion, profits, wages, or employment (or increasing underemploy-
ment) in the domestic industry concerned....
The list of factors considered may differ from investigation to in-
vestigation and still be consistent with the requirements of the
law. Moreover, the legislative history of the provision indicates
that the Senate Finance Committee did not intend that the Com-
mission apply any mathematical test in its determination of the
presence of serious injury and the threat of serious injury. 9 The
absence of mathematical certainty in a list of factors, however,
does not prevent beneficial results in individual cases. The list of
factors, indicates what types of economic information are impor-
tant to the Commission and provides a frame of reference for the
analysis of information submitted to the Commission in written
submissions, oral presentations at hearings, and in posthearing
briefs. It also provides guidelines for the Commission's profes-
sional staff for the analysis of the information gathered during the
course of the Commission's investigations.
Prior to the provisions of the Trade Agreements Act, the Anti-
dumping Act, 1921, and the countervailing duty statute did not in-
clude provisions listing factors to be taken into account in making
injury determinations. Commission experience in the administra-
tion of the Antidumping Act, however, did reveal that certain fac-
tors recurred in injury determinations in different investigations.
These factors were reported to Congressional committees41 and
were used subsequently as checklists in Commission determina-
tions in individual cases. The Commission's decision to interpret
the operative language of the countervailing duty statute in the
same way as it interpreted identical language in the Antidumping
"' S. REP. 1298, supra note 22, at 120.
" The operative language of section 160(a) of the Antidumping Act, 1921, was the same
as that in section 303(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930-
whether an industry in the United States is being or is likely to be injured, or is
prevented from being established, by reason of the importation of such ... mer-
chandise into the United States ....
See Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 7556: State, Justice,
and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1978,
Part 5, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 574 (1977); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Trade of
the Committee on Ways and Means, supra note 36.
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Act" resulted in antidumping determinations providing guidance
for the analysis of information in countervailing duty investiga-
tions. The injury factors have been further refined in order to
analyze the causation between the importation of products and
the injury or threat of injury experienced by the domestic in-
dustry."
Because these investigations focus on pricing competition and
market share, the primary indicia of injury are price depression,
price suppression, and lost sales. Other factors, such as lost pro-
fits, under-utilization of productive facilities, and unemployment,
result from lost market share.
V. STANDARDS FOR THE CAUSATION OF INJURY
In each of the trade laws under discussion, the Commission must
find that the injury or threat of injury to the domestic industry is
a result of the import competition which is the subject of the
statutory investigation. For example, the standard of causation
contained in section 201 of the Trade Act is expressed as
"substantiAl cause" which is defined as "a cause which is impor-
tant and not less important than any other cause."" No weighing
of causation was contemplated, however.'5 Section 406 contains a
42 Prior to the Trade Act of 1974, the countervailing duty statute reached only dutiable
imports and it did not require any injury determination. Section 331 of the 1974 act extended
the law to reach certain duty-free merchandise and provided that the Commission conduct
the type of injury investigation for duty-free subsidized imports that it did for less-than-
fair-value imporLs under the Antidumping Act, 1921.
In the first such investigation conducted under section 303(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the
Commission opinion stated
In making its determination set out above, the Commission has interpreted the
relevant operative words of section 303(b)-
whether an industry in the United States is being or is likely to be in-
jured, or is prevented from being established, by reason of the importa-
tion of such . . . merchandise into the United States ...
in the same way it has interpreted identical language under section 201(a) of the
Antidumping Act, 1921, as amended. This was clearly the intent of Congress in
using identical language. Thus, Commission determinations under the Antidump-
ing Act provide guidance for the Commission's determination in this investiga-
tion. Cer-Zories from the Republic of China (Taiwan), Investigation No. 303-TA-1
(September 1976), at 4-5.
Concurring opinions of Commissioner Stern in Rayon Staple Fiber from France and
Finland, Investigation Nos. AA1921-190 and AA1921-191 (February 1979), at 9-10; Certain
Steel Wire Nails from Canada, Investigation No. AA1921-189 (February 1979), at 10-11.
Subsection 201(b)(4).
, S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 22, at 120.
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"significant cause" requirement. The Senate Finance Committee
report on the bill stated that this standard was intended to be an
easier standard to satisfy than the "substantial cause" require-
ment in section 201.46 The report also stated that the "term
'significant cause' was meant to require a more direct causal rela-
tionship between increased imports and injury" than the standard
used in the adjustment assistance provisions of that act. 7 The
causation standard in the adjustment assistance provisions of the
bill, namely, the phrase "contribute importantly," was described
by the Committee as a cause which may have contributed less
than another cause, but must have been more than a de minimis
source of causation." The Committee did acknowledge, however,
that a "mechanical designation such as a percentage of causation"
cannot be applied." In an understatement, the report also said
that the committee recognized "that 'weighing' causes in a
dynamic economy is not always possible."5 Presumably this con-
fused discussion means that the coincidence of increased imports
and the existence of material injury will not serve to establish a
connection between the two for the purposes of section 406,
although they might for the purposes of the adjustment assistance
provisions.51 In other words, the Commission must be able to iden-
tify and describe a cause and effect relationship from the informa-
tion generated by the investigation. The standard is, therefore,
one of contributing causation.
Both the antidumping and the countervailing duty provisions of
the Tariff Act of 1930 require the Commission to determine
whether the injury is "by reason of" the importation of merchan-
dise sold at less than fair value. 2 As a matter of administrative
practice under the Antidumping Act, 1921, the Commission
sought to establish a relationship or "causal link" between the
margin of less than fair value and a price differential between
resold less-than-fair-value imported products and competing ar-
ticles manufactured by the U.S. industry. The assumption was
that the less-than-fair-value margin provided the importer with a
price advantage which could be passed through successive chan-
I ld. at 212.
47 1d
" Id. at 133.
4 Id.
10 See note 45 supra.
" The Secretary of Labor is charged with determining the eligibility of groups of
workers to apply for adjustment assistance under section 222 of the Trade Act of 1974.
6 See sections 705 and 735, respectively.
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nels of distribution. The Commission proceeded by calculating the
margin of dumping against the home market or third market price
of the imports as determined by the Treasury Department." For
example, if the home market price was $5.00 and the price per ex-
port to the U.S. $4.00, the difference of $1.00 would be divided by
the $5.00 figure, yielding a less-than-fair margin of 20 percent. If
the dumped merchandise undersold the United States by greater
than 20 percent, the Commission would conclude that the less-
than-fair-value margin did not have a causal relationship to the in-
jury.
The operation of this causation test is shown in an antidumping
investigation concerning Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube
from Japan. In that case, three Commissioners wrote an opinion
for the Commission in which they expressed the theory that there
was no injury by reason of less-than-fair-value margin of the im-
ports.
Whatever injury the domestic industry may have suffered, it
was not by reason of imports sold at LTFV. Pipe and tubing im-
ported from Japan undersold domestically produced pipe and
tubing by average weighted margins ranging from 17 to 25 per-
cent from 1974 to the first quarter of 1978, while the dumping
margin, ie., the margin by which Treasury found that the
Japanese pipe and tubing was sold below fair value was 3.1 per-
cent on an average weighted basis. Thus, the dumping margin
accounted for only a small part of the amount by which the
Japanese pipe and tubing undersold the domestic product. Even
without the LTFV margins, the Japanese pipe and tubing would
have been priced substantially below domestically produced
pipe and tubing and at a price differential to attract sales from
domestic producers. Under these circumstances, any sales that
U.S. producers might have lost to Japanese imports or any price
suppression that might have been experienced by U.S. pro-
ducers cannot be attributed to the LTFV margins applicable to
the imports from Japan. '
In a concurring opinion two other Commissioners stated that
[wlhen the LTFV margins are compared to the average
margins of underselling, it is apparent that the lost sales cannot
be attributed to LTFV sales. Pipe and tube imported from
See, e.g., Railway Track Maintenance Equipment from Austria, Investigation No.
AA1921-173 (November 1977), at A-3.
" Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube from Japan, Investigation No. AA1921-180 (July
1978) at A-5.
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Japan undersold domestically produced pipe and tube by
average weighted margins ranging from 17 to 25 percent during
1974-77 and January-March 1978. However, the dumping margin
(3.1 percent on an average weighted basis), accounted for only a
small margin of the underselling. Thus, even without the LTFV
margins the Japanese pipe and tube would have been priced
substantially below the normal differential required to attract
sales from domestic producers. Under these circumstances any
sales that U.S. producers may have lost to Japanese imports or
any price suppression that might have been experienced by U.S.
producers cannot be attributed to the LTFV margins applicable
to the imports from Japan.5
The administrative practice of creating a legal fiction, i e., that a
less-than-fair-value margin between constructed foreign home
market prices and the prices for export to the United States (as
adjusted by the Treasury Department), created a pricing differen-
tial which was passed through successive channels of distribution
from the importer to the point of competition with sales of
domestically produced goods. This operated as a rebuttable pre-
sumption which was consistently and uniformly employed by the
Commission in its administration of the Antidumping Act, 1921.1
It can be argued that the new antidumping provisions of Title
VII of the Tariff Act do not authorize such an administrative prac-
tice. This argument is based upon the following analysis. First,
like the Antidumping Act, 1921, the literal terms of the new provi-
sions merely charge the Commission with a determination of
whether injury is caused by the importation of the dumped mer-
chandise. There was no statutory directive under the 1921 Act to
determine whether there is injury by reason of the importation of
the merchandise at a less-than-fair-value margin recalculated by
the Commission, nor is there any such directive under the new
law. Second, although the administrative practice of creating a
rebuttable presumption was not an unreasonable interpretation of
the 1921 Act, two specific provisions of the new law interfere with
its continuation. Subsection 771(7)(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930
directs the Commission to consider price suppression as well as
price depression in evaluating the imports of dumped merchan-
dise on prices in the United States for like products. The provi-
" Id. at 11-12.
" A uniform and consistently applied interpretation by the agency charged with the ad-
ministration of the statute is usually given weight by courts in construing the statute.
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sion specifically requires the Commission to consider "whether ...
the effect of imports of such merchandise ...prevents price in-
creases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant
degree." Essentially, this type of analysis requires the Commis-
sion to determine whether the price of the competitive domestic
product is increasing less rapidly than an index of comparable ar-
ticles. This analysis is different from that used in rebuttable
presumption that a less-than-fair-margin causes underselling.
Underselling would be demonstrated by an absolute price dif-
ferential between identical products. Both the domestic and the
imported product must be of the same quality for the underselling
measure to have any validity.
Even more significant is the direction in the new law to the
Commission that it "consider whether the volume of imports of
the [dumped] merchandise, or any increase in that volume, either
in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the
United States is significant."57 This provision would permit a
determination of material injury without any demonstrable price
effect at all. Such a provision is not unreasonable. Costs are impor-
tant with many products. Experience-curve theorists relate
market share, market growth, and declining costs with increased
output." Where imports increase their market share at the ex-
pense of domestic companies, they can prevent the domestic com-
panies from attaining economies of scale at which their costs
decrease and profits increase.
Similar considerations concerning the "causal link" are relevant
to the administration of the countervailing duty statute. A foreign
subsidy might not have any price effect in the U.S. market. Even
if the foreign subsidy does have a price effect in the U.S. market,
assuming that it is identifiable and measurable, a duty is assessed
on the basis, of the per-unit amount of the subsidy, not its price ef-
fect. Logiqally there is no necessary connection between many
subsidies and pricing strategies for imports in the U.S. market.
There is no conceptual need for an analogy between government
subsidies and dumping. As one commentator noted,
the charging of different prices for the same product in different
markets can result from the fact that there are always some im-
pediments to arbitrage and from the fact the elasticities of de-
" Subsection 771(7)(C)(i) of the Tariff Act of 1930.
" See, e.g., Walter Kiechel III, Playing by the Rules of the Corporate Strategy Game,
Fortune (September 24, 1979), at 110; Bruzzell, Gale, and Sultan, Market Share-A Key to
Profitability, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (January-February 1975), at 97.
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mand vary from market to market.... This has nothing to do
with the question of subsidies.59
Moreover, requiring the presence of a price differential in an in-
jury determination under the countervailing duty statute could
establish a loophole for competitive advantages bestowed on ex-
porters of the subsidized merchandise. Examples of these advan-
tages would include the ability to provide concessionary credit,
product guarantees, and advertising.' In spite of these considera-
tions, the Commission did employ a "causal link" analogy to its
practice under the Antidumping Act, 1921 in its first countervail-
ing duty investigation, concerning zories from Taiwan. The Com-
mission opinion stated:
the bounty or grant paid on the subject imports of zories would
amount to only about 1.3 cents per pair. Such a bounty or grant
would account for only a fraction of the margin of underselling
which the subject imports enjoy over casual footwear produced
in the United States. On the basis of these facts, we conclude
that any injury or likelihood of injury which an [sic] domestic in-
dustry may be experiencing is not by reason of the subject im-
ports of zories.'
Should the Commission adopt the standard that material injury
under the new antidumping and countervailing duty laws must be
"by reason of" the imports of merchandise which is sold at less
than fair value or subsidized rather than continue to require that
the amount of the margin or the amount of the subsidy cause the
injury through a price effect in the U.S. market, the standard of
causation for injury under these laws will not differ from that
under section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974. The "by reason of"
language has consistently been interpreted as a contributing
cause standard. For instance, in a 1968 report to the Senate
Finance Committee, the Commission stated that the "by reason of"
standard of the Antidumping Act, 1921, did
not require that a determination that dumped imports are
adversely affecting an industry to a degree greater than any one
or a combination of other factors adversely affecting an industry
before there can be an affirmative determination of injury....
59 MALMGREN, INTERNATIONAL ORDER FOR PUBLIC SUBSIDIEs 40-41 (1977).
Report of the U.S. International Trade Commission on Investigation No. 332-101,
Agreements Being Negotiated at the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva, reprinted
in SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE MTN STUDIES No. 6, Part 1 (Comm. Print 96-27 Aug.
1977), at 186.
" See note 42 supra, at 7.
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The Commission in making its determinations with respect to in-
jury under the Act has not weighed the injury caused by such
imports against other injuries that an industry might be suffer-
ing. 
2
This policy has been articulated in the opinions of Commissioners
concerning their determinations in individual investigations, e.g.,
besides less than fair value sales, other causes of injury are also
present.... All that is required for an affirmative determination
is that the less than fair value sales be a cause of injury to a
domestic industry. The causation between sales at less than fair
value must be identifable; ie., the injury must result from less
than fair value sales.63
The legislative history of the Trade Agreements Act confirms
that the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means committees
intended that the use of the "by reason of" language in Title VII
of the Tariff Act of 1930 would not change the contributing cause
standard applied in the Antidumping Act, 1921 and the injury pro-
visions of the countervailing duty statute."
VI. CONCLUSION
A recapitulation of the discussion in this paper illustrates the
potential for a convergence of methodology and standards ap-
plicable to these statutory investigations. If the "causal link"
theory of tracing less-than-fair-value margins and ad valorem
equivalents of foreign subsidies to price effects in domestic
markets is discontinued, and the Commission instead determines
whether there is injury by reason of the importation of the
dumped or subsidized merchandise into the United States, the ap-
plication of these statutes would operate much as sections 201 and
406 operate in response to an increasing volume of imports. The
similarity of the legislative history for the standard of injury
causation, which must be attributable to the imports subject to in-
vestigation, would justify the Commission's explicit adoption of a
contributing cause standard for investigations under the antidump-
" Report of the U.S. Tariff Commission on S. Con. 38, reprinted in Senate Committee on
Finance, International Antidumping Code Hearing, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., June 27, 1968, at
331-332.
Concurring opinion of Commissioners Leonard and Young in Elemental Sulfur from
Mexico, Investigation No. AA1921-92 (May 1972), at 9.
" Senate Committee on Finance, Trade Agreements Act of 1979, S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 57 (1979); House Committee on Ways and Means, Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, H.R. REP. No. 96-317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 47 (1979).
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ing and countervailing duty provisions of the Tariff Act and sec-
tion 406 of the Trade Act. The similarity of the material injury
standards for these provisions would justify the Commission's
adopting the material injury standard set forth in subsection
771(7)(A) of the Tariff Act 5 for investigations conducted under sec-
tion 406 of the Trade Act. Finally, the check-list approach
legislated under section 201 of the Trade Act and under section
771 of the Tariff Act would justify the Commission's developing a
group of factors along with standards for allocating financial data
to discrete product lines which would be used in all of the in-
vestigations discussed. The basic differences remaining among the
statutes would be the remedy sought by the petitioner and the
higher standards of injury and causation in section 201.
'5 Subsection 771(7) provides that
The term 'material injury' means harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial,
or unimportant.
